Importance of Marbury V Madison and the Concept of Judicial Review

On February 24, 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall issued the Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison, establishing the ramble and philosophical principles behind the high court'south power of judicial review.

The dramatic tale begins with the presidential election of 1800, in which President John Adams, a Federalist, lost reelection to Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican. Congress likewise inverse hands, with the Autonomous-Republicans achieving majorities in both chambers.

Adams and the Federalists could see the writing on the wall: the political party's power had been limited to the judicial branch. In a bid to strengthen Federalist ability, President Adams appointed Secretarial assistant of State John Marshall to be Main Justice of the United states of america. The Federalists, with weeks remaining in the lame-duck session, passed a new Judiciary Act—the "Circuit Courtroom Act"—which expanded the jurisdiction of the excursion courts and created six new circuits with 16 new judicial seats. (The law also eliminated circuit duty for Supreme Court justices, and provided for easier removal of litigation from state to federal court.)

To fill the newly expanded judiciary, on March 1, 1801, three days before Jefferson's inauguration, Adams stayed upwards belatedly into the night signing commissions for the new judges, including the 42 new Justices of the Peace. The "midnight appointments," as they came to exist known, were likewise notarized by Marshall, still performing his secretarial duties. But the blitz of presidential transition led to the administration's failure to deliver several of those commissions, including that owed to William Marbury, who had been named a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. On March 4, upon bold the office of the presidency, Jefferson ordered Secretarial assistant of Land James Madison not to deliver the commissions.

Marbury'south lost committee became a test instance for the ousted Federalists who were outraged over the Autonomous-Republican Congress'due south repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the passing of a replacement act in 1802, and who were hoping to test its constitutionality as shortly as possible. Before the Supreme Court considered the case in February, Congress held a viciously partisan debate over the constitutionality of the Repeal Act, with Republicans claiming that the people were the final judges of the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Marbury, with representation from Adams' Chaser Full general Charles Lee, demanded a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Courtroom to obtain his committee.

In M arbury v. Madison, the Courtroom was asked to answer iii questions. Did Marbury take a right to his commission? If he had such a right, and the right was violated, did the police force provide a remedy? And if the law provided a remedy, was the proper remedy a direct order from the Supreme Courtroom?

Writing for the Court in 1803, Marshall answered the starting time two questions resoundingly in the affirmative. Marbury's commission had been signed by the President and sealed past the Secretary of Country, he noted, establishing an appointment that could not be revoked by a new executive. Failure to deliver the committee thus violated Marbury'due south legal right to the office.

Marshall also ruled that Marbury was indeed entitled to a legal remedy for his injury. Citing the great William Blackstone's Commentaries, the Master Justice declared "a general and indisputable rule" that, where a legal right is established, a legal remedy exists for a violation of that right.

 It was in the third office of the opinion that presented a dilemma: If Marshall decided to grant the remedy and order delivery of the commissions, he risked only beingness ignored past his rivals, thereby exposing the young Supreme Courtroom as powerless to enforce its decisions, and damaging its futurity legitimacy. But siding with Madison would accept been seen every bit caving to political pressure level—an equally dissentious outcome, peculiarly to Marshall who valued the Court equally a nonpartisan institution. The ultimate resolution is seen by many scholars as a fine balancing of these interests: Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court could non society delivery of the commissions, because the law establishing such a power was unconstitutional itself.

That law, Section xiii of the Judiciary Human activity of 1789, said the Court had "original jurisdiction" in a case like Marbury—in other words, Marbury was able to bring his lawsuit straight to the Supreme Court instead of get-go going through lower courts. Citing Article III, Section two of the Constitution, Marshall pointed out that the Supreme Court was given original jurisdiction only in cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" or in cases "in which a State shall be Party." Had the Founders intended to empower Congress to assign original jurisdiction, Marshall reasoned, they would not have enumerated those types of cases. Congress, therefore, was exerting ability it did not have.

This was an exercise of judicial review, the power to review the constitutionality of legislation. To be sure, Marshall did not invent judicial review—several land courts had already exercised judicial review, and delegates to the Constitutional Convention and ratifying debates spoke explicitly about such power being given to the federal courts. The Court itself in the 1796 case of Hylton 5. Usa reviewed and upheld an act of Congress as ramble—with Alexander Hamilton arguing for the validity of the taxation in question. And in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia creditor law in conflict with the Treaty of Paris based on federal supremacy.

Still, the legendary Chief Justice applied judicial review firmly and artfully to the nation's highest courtroom. "It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department," he wrote, "to say what the police force is." Until Marbury, judicial review was not widely accepted in cases of hundred-to-one unconstitutionality and was not an aspect of ordinary judicial activity, and its scope was more modest. And while Marbury was not a specially controversial conclusion in 1803, it has remained the source of scholarly argue.

In the short run, Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans got what they wanted: Marbury and the other "midnight appointments" were denied commissions. But in the long run, Marshall got what he wanted: A contained Supreme Court with the ability of judicial review. As historian Gordon Woods eloquently put it, Marshall'due south greatest achievement was not invented judicial review, but "maintaining the Courtroom's being and asserting its independence in a hostile Republican climate."

For more reading on the fence betwixt scholars over the pregnant of Marbury and its implication for judicial review and judicial supremacy, consider the following:

Bruce Ackerman, Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Commonwealth (Harvard University Press 2005)

Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (1919)

Edward Southward. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Court (1977)

Mark A. Graber, "Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Institution of Judicial Ability," 12 Const. Comm. 68, https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/167160/12_01_Graber.pdf?sequence=ane&isAllowed=y

Charles Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Dominion of Constabulary (1996)

Michael J. Klarman, "How Great Were the 'Cracking' Marshall Court Decisions?" Va. L. Rev. (2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270081

Larry Kramer, "Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy," 20 Const. Comm. 205 (2003), https://salvation.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/183156/20_02_Kramer.pdf

Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers Constitution (2000)

Jed Handelsman Shugerman, "Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington five. Polk and Maryland Judiciary Battle," 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 58 (2002), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol5/iss1/3/

William W. Van Alstyne, "A Disquisitional Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 18 Duke L. J. 1-47 (1969), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/544/

Louise Weinberg, "Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium," 89 Va. L. Rev. 1235 (2003), https://law.utexas.edu/kinesthesia/uploads/publication_files/ourmarburypub.pdf

Nicholas Mosvick is a Senior Fellow for Ramble Content at the National Constitution Center.

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Source: https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/marbury-v-madison-and-the-independent-supreme-court

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